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The London Waterworks Controversy
The Great Debate of 1875-1877
Marvin L. Simner
y the mid-1870s it was widely
recognized that if London were to
grow and prosper, a search for a
dependable water source to meet
its needs was vital for several reasons.  The
first was to provide London with a constant
supply of fresh drinkable water as stated in
a brief submitted by the London Medical
Association to the London City Council on
February 15, 1875.
…a supply of pure water is
necessary to the sanitary
condition of the city, and that the
present supply of water from
wells is, in very many localities
dangerous to health, in
consequence of the soil being
porous and becoming gradually
saturated with impurities from
privies, cess-pools, stables, &c.,
thereby poisoning the water…1
Indeed, the Medical Association had
concluded “that a considerable portion of
the sickness and mortality that have
occurred in the city during the past year is
traceable to impurities in the (well) water.”
To rectify this problem, City Council was
made aware of three fresh water springs
adjacent to a woolen mill on the Thames
owned by Charles Coombs.   William
Saunders, a chemist and local pharmacist,
reported that the water from these springs
was “entirely free from organic matter,
nitrates of lead, iron and other unnatural
impurities, and when submitted to the
highly magnifying power of a microscope,
there is no appearance whatever of
microscopic organisms.”2 Not only was
this water said to be superior “to the water
from wells in various (other) parts of the
city,” the amount produced by the streams
on a daily basis (2,065,207 gallons) was
also said to be sufficient to supply a city
twice the size of London.  Hence, of the
many sites in and around London where
water was available, this site was
considered the best.
The second reason for seeking a
dependable supply of water was the
constant fear of fire.  Between 1852 (which
is the earliest year for which records are
available) and 1875 London experienced
484 fires leading to a total financial loss  of
$1,167,700.3 Although many of the fires
were minor, typically  one major fire
occurred nearly every year in and around
the downtown area.  In 1870, for example,
many downtown commercial structures
were lost.
The tinshop of I.W.C. Baker was
burned January 5, 1870, entailing
a loss of $2,500.  The other
property destroyed (on January 5)
was A. Johnston’s building,
$1,400; Hiscox’s Hotel, $1,600;
T. Powell’s furniture, $500; Mrs.
Trebilcock’s stock, about $600;
Goldner & Hooper’s, about $300;
Dr. Westland’s furniture, $300;
B
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and Benj. Higgin’s building, $300
–in all, $7,500.  The O’Callagnan
and Elson frame building,
which stood on Richmond
Street, opposite the City Hall,
was burned January 21….The fire
on Duke and Cartwright Street,
of February 22, destroyed property
valued at $2,000. The grocery
store of Michael Gleeson, on
Richmond and Bathurst Streets,
was destroyed by fire, February
27….The petroleum works of
Englehart & Company on
Adelaide Street, were destroyed by
fire, February 24….A second
explosion at Englehart’s on
April 9, entailed a loss of $2,000;
and a third on May 23, 1870,
damaged property valued at
$6,000. Macmillan & Latham’s
oil still exploded August 11.4
While London’s property owners
were clearly concerned over their personal
losses as the result of fire, it was also
widely recognized that if London did
not develop an effective firefighting
system, this could severely hamper the
city’s competitive edge in fostering
future growth. By 1875 Hamilton,
Windsor, Toronto, and Ottawa all had
established effective waterworks systems
for extinguishing fires, which meant
that each of these cities would have a major
advantage over London in attracting
businesses and manufacturing enterprises.
The London city engineer, arguing
in favour of developing a similar system
for London, addressed this matter in
the following way.
…if large stocks of valuable goods
may be held as safe from the
ravages of fire as elsewhere, and at
the lowest rates of insurance,
London may become the depot for
many a new establishment which
otherwise would go elsewhere.5
The system he recommended
was similar to that found in many
neighbouring communities, i.e., water from
a natural flowing source would be
delivered through a pumphouse to
a reservoir located at or close to the top of a
nearby hill. The water stored in
the reservoir would then be released
through a gravity flow system to hydrants
located throughout the downtown area.
According to a report by the city engineer,
Hungerfort Hill (also known as Chestnut
Hill and today as Reservoir Park),
was directly opposite the springs on
Coombs’ property, and was 270 feet (82.29
metres) above the surface of the Thames
River. Because this elevation exceeded
by more than 150 feet (45.72 metres) the
highest elevation in and around
the downtown area, it was anticipated
that water from the reservoir would reach
the city under sufficient pressure to activate
fire hoses attached to the hydrants.
In short, the springs on Coombs’ property
were said to satisfy both the needs of
the citizens for a drinkable source of water
and the needs of the city to provide
adequate fire protection to the downtown
stores, shops and hotels, and even to
some of London’s private residences.
What was required before this proposal
could be enacted, however, was approval
from the residents in the form of a bylaw
to endorse the necessary financing.
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Despite the reasonable nature of this
proposal, it took three referenda for the
bylaw to pass.  Meanwhile, London
continued to burn.
The First Referendum
On February 22, 1875 the City Council
approved a bylaw that contained the
following main provisions.6
1) That water-works for the
city of London shall…be
constructed, managed and
maintained by and through the
agency of Commissioners.
2) That for the purpose
of construction…the mayor
(shall) raise by way of
loan…the sum of four hundred
thousand dollars…though
debentures…that shall bear
interest of seven percent per
annum…payable half yearly in
each and every year.
3) (In order to retire this debt) an
annual special rate of five mills
and seven-tenths of a mill on
the dollar shall be levied and
collected, in addition to all
other rates in each year from
the first issue of the
debentures…upon all rateable
property in the said city.
In the weeks leading up to the
referendum all of the arguments in favour
of the need for clean water and effective
fire protection appeared in a four page
broadside which was widely distributed by
the London City Council. Although both
the London Free Press and the Daily
Advertiser were strongly in support of
some form of waterworks scheme, the
debate that ensued was acrimonious and
highly divisive.
Prior to the referendum held on March
29, 1875, and in addition to the broadside,
City Council ordered the complete bylaw
to be published in the city papers for one
month. City Council also held open
meetings in each of the seven wards to
fully inform the citizens about the nature of
the undertaking. For the majority of
citizens the major issue was the overall
expense versus the overall benefit of fire
and health protection. Throughout the
month, summaries of the meetings
appeared in both newspapers along with
letters, largely from irate citizens who
expressed considerable anger over the need
for this undertaking.
The major points raised in opposition
to the bylaw surfaced during the first open
meeting which was held on March 4th.
Since the city debt was already $1, 150,
787 6 many voiced the opinion that this
proposed expense of $400,000 would
increase the debt by nearly 35%.
In addition, the proposed increase in
property taxes was also said to be excessive
since it was doubtful if home owners in all
of the wards would benefit equally from the
proposed fire protection scheme because of
the distances of their homes from the
downtown core. Closely related to these
two points was a disbelief in the lack of
purity of well water.  Because of this
disbelief, it was also argued that since the
major need was for water to extinguish
fires, river water would suffice and
could be obtained at a far lower cost.
The following letter from W.Y. Brunton is
one example of the arguments that
frequently appeared in the Advertiser.
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My taxes are now fifteen
dollars per foot per annum,
frontage.  Should the by-
law…receive a majority of
votes in its favour instead of
fifteen dollars they will be
twenty-one.  I am not opposed
to waterworks, quite the
contrary; but I am thoroughly
opposed to the present scheme.
I have no hesitation in saying
that we can get a full supply of
water for fire and household
purposes, drinking water
excepted, for less money than
is required by “Coombs Pond,”
by adopting the same system
that the Great Western Railway
has, viz, pumping it from the
river.7
Indeed, Fred S. Wilkes from Branford,
Ontario had submitted the following
proposal that relied on water from the
Thames River at Dundas Street.
We estimate for two engines,
two boilers, two pumps…
fifty double anti-freezing
fire hydrants…(along with a)
building suitable for
machinery and an engineer to
reside in, all set up and put in
complete operation and
warranted capable of throwing
eight good efficient fire
streams for $55,000.8
Despite the positive response that was
initially anticipated by Council, in an
address before Council on March 11, the
mayor summarized the negative
experiences that he encountered when he
addressed the Ward 2 rate payers during a
meeting held the night before.
His Worship said that during
the whole of the time he had
filled the civic chair, he had
never been so abused as he had
been at that meeting; he felt
that men who ought to have
known better, had grossly
insulted the board over which
he presided.  The entire burden
had been thrown on his
shoulders; and he now wished
the council to say what action
they would take in the
matter—whether it would be
advisable or not to withdraw
the by-law for the present.9
The reason for suggesting that the
bylaw be withdrawn was that if the
bylaw were defeated, it could not be
brought up again for one year. In spite
of the risk of defeat Council allowed the
referendum to stand.  Given the level of
opposition, however, it is not surprising
that when the referendum was held on
March 29th, an overwhelming majority
voted against the bylaw.  Across all
seven wards, 699 votes were cast against
while only 243 votes were cast in
favour.10 In commenting on this matter
the Free Press summarized the outcome
in the following way.  “…so many of the
voters seem to have thought that, as they
have wells in their back-yards, there is
no need of water-works…Many have
said (however) that they are in favor of
such works as might do duty in case of
fire…but such works can be had for far
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less than $400,000, and if they can, why
ask us to vote so large a sum?...the
feeling behind this (claim) is that if the
money is once voted, it will be spent, no
matter what.”11
As mentioned above, with the defeat of
the bylaw the city was prevented from
issuing another for at least one year.
What occurred during this interval?  Not
unexpectedly, and beginning in April,
throughout the first four months
following the defeat, London experienced
a number of fires. On April 16 Andrews’
Brush Factory located on Richmond
Street south of Kent was destroyed.  “Mr.
Andrews’ stock, tools and furniture were
totally destroyed, entailing a loss of at
least two thousand dollars, upon which
there is an insurance of one-half that
amount.”12 The next morning a fire
occurred in a grocery store at the corner
of Horton and Ridout where “the stock of
groceries and furniture is almost (a) total
loss…(Although) valued at nine hundred
dollars, (they were only) partially covered
by an insurance of five hundred
dollars.”13 Then on April 26 a building in
Victoria Park that previously had served
as officer’s quarters when the regiment
was stationed in London and now housed
ten families, burnt to the ground.14
And so it went: in May there were
eight fires, including one in the third story
of the Bank of British North America and
in the Ramsey and Sleightholm planning
mill and sash factory near the Grand
Trunk Station.  Then in June there were
12 more, and in July 11 others. In fact the
situation had become so bad that The
London Evening Advertiser, in an
editorial at the end of May, stated that
“London is now being visited by an
epidemic of fire, and the question of how
long it is going to last is one which,
though full of interest, is more easily
asked than answered.”15 Clearly, London
was in a desperate situation.
How did the city cope with this
situation?  Up to this point London relied
on water placed in brick tanks that
measured two by five meters sunk three
meters in the ground at various locations
throughout the city.  In total there were
approximately 64 water tanks in London
but only about 40 per cent were said to be
in good condition.  Because the covers
were made of wood, many had rotted,
were in danger of caving in when driven
over by teams of heavy horses, and were
condemned as unreliable.16
Water from the tanks was delivered
through hoses attached to pumps mounted
on fire engines that were brought to the
scene of a fire.  The major drawback with
this procedure was that, since the tanks
were not water tight, they “had to be
filled regularly as the level could drop by
as much as one meter in a day.”  If the
tanks ran dry and nearby wells were not
available before the fires were exting-
uished the buildings would burn to the
ground.  Thus, the major protection
against loss was to remove all of the
flammable contents before the buildings
were engulfed in flames.
Upon the occasion of a fire, no
cry can be more afflictive or
suggestive than that of ‘no water,’
yet upon the recurrence of every
fire in this city the same cry is
repeated until a fatal apathy as to
results seems to have set in….The
precarious supply provided by
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(the tanks), the pumps and the
wells only suggests the necessity
of more adequate provision, and
beyond these puny resources,
none whatever exists.17
The Second Referendum
Needless to say, all of the members of
City Council were very aware of the need
to secure a more dependable supply of water
that could be delivered under constant
pressure. Given the urgency associated
with this need, it is quite surprising that
Council did not address this matter as soon
as possible, which would have been one year
following the first referendum.  Instead
two years were allowed to pass before the
issue was once again brought to the fore.
Thus, on June 4, 1877, it was moved
and carried:
…that this Council being of the
opinion that the time has arrived
when water-works should be
introduced for general purposes
and that the matter be referred
back to the Fire, Water and Gas
Committee for the purpose of
bringing in a detailed statement of
the different schemes that may be
submitted to them, giving the
number of hydrants, location of
the same, and number of miles
of piping in the city, for the
approval of this Council.18
After giving careful consideration to
all of the arguments advanced by those who
opposed the 1875 bylaw, on July 9, the
committee submitted a full report to council
that began with the following information.
Your Committee were
authorized by resolution of
Council to prepare a cheap and
efficient scheme for water
works, that would meet present
necessities and be acceptable to
the ratepayers…For this the
works at Hamilton, Brantford,
St. Catharines, Sarnia, Port
Huron, Detroit and Windsor
were visited…and thoroughly
investigated…(It was therefore
concluded that) the engine
house and pumping apparatus
be built at the west end of
Dundas street and water supply
to be taken from the north
branch of the River Thames
sufficiently far north to get the
sole supply from that
branch…and that further delay
on the part of Council in this
matter would be esteemed by
all concerned in the welfare and
protection of the city as little
else than criminal.19
The final bylaw that went to the public
for approval on August 22 contained the
following main provision: “That the
amount of the debt intended to be created
by the construction of the said Waterworks
is the sum of one hundred and fifty
thousand dollars…to be raised by the issue
of Waterworks Debentures…paid for
through general taxation.”
As was the case with the previous bylaw,
this provision and the new recommendation
were both printed in the newspapers during
the month preceding the referendum and
public meetings were also held throughout
the city to discuss the referendum.  Although
The London and Middlesex Historian
Volume 24, Autumn 2015
25
once more City Council felt that it had
addressed the needs of the citizens, the
following letter that appeared in the
Advertiser on August 10 summarized the
major arguments voiced by many who
opposed this second bylaw.
To me and to many others as
well, judging from the expressions
of opinion of those around me,
the arguments and assertions
in support of the scheme
were far from satisfactory. It was
admitted from the outset that
the proposed plan was for a
temporary supply for fire
and manufacturing purposes only,
and that at some future time
it would of necessity have
to be extended so as to meet
the demand for domestic
consumption.  This partial, temp-
orary scheme, however, which
will benefit only the centre of the
city where the manufacturers are
located and the greatest danger
from fire exists, (why) must (the
cost) be shouldered by the entire
community.20
The writer also drew attention to the fact
that the water level in the Thames does not
remain constant throughout the year, “…as
anyone will admit who will take the trouble
to look at the dry, stony bed of the river at
this season of the year, when an ample
supply of water is most needed…the water
is under the stones and is hidden from
view.”  In other words, if the Thames could
only be depended on to supply an ample
amount of water during certain seasons, the
city would be no better off than when it
relied on brick tanks to provide the
necessary water.
The Free Press also condemned the
present scheme and, along with the
ratepayers in Ward 6 together with many
others, called for the withdrawal of the
bylaw.  “It would be far better to do that
than to throw the whole idea over for (still)
another year.  No one denies that water-
works are badly needed, imperatively
required, but the contention is that the
present scheme submitted by the Council is
an ill-advised one.”21
On August 20, Council received
a resolution from Ward 6 together with a
petition from “James Rogers and over 200
others, asking the Council to withdraw the
waterworks bylaw and substitute the
Coombs’ scheme instead.”22 During the
course of the meeting many of the
counsellors spoke on behalf of the petition.
At the end of the discussion, the petition was
approved and the second bylaw was
withdrawn.  Although the Advertiser was
also strongly in favour of the move to
withdraw, the next day in a lead editorial the
Advertiser published an extremely caustic
assessment of Council’s overall role in first
promoting this venture, then supporting its
demise.
The exhibition last night at the
Council Board was the culmination
of municipal imbecility…we
have now seen a real Mayor and
Council displaying a helplessness
and incompetency unparalleled,
and that upon a subject as well
understood by men of ordinary
education as the erection of a
house or the building of a bridge.
We did not enter largely into the
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discussion of the waterworks
question, nor did we fill our
columns with matter relating to it.
It was a good opportunity to let the
people display their superiority to
the men who are ambitious
to govern them.23
Needless to say, City Council was
extremely upset over the editorial and
during its next regular session (August 27)
stated that the editorial writer “with his
characteristic meanness, fairly outrivals
himself in deliberate falsehood and low,
scurrilous abuse…”  With these thoughts
in mind, Council resolved that:
…to maintain its dignity as a
corporation, and assert their
individuality and independence as
public men and as citizens, and
resent the false aspersions and
mean insinuations levelled at the
Council generally and the
Chairman of the Fire, Water and
Gas Committee in particular, and
that we demand a full and ample
apology from the writer; and if this
reasonable demand be not
complied with the Editor of said
Daily Advertiser will forfeit the
confidence of this Council, as a
public journalist and as an
honorable man, and that we cease
to have any communication with
him in a business capacity, or
otherwise as  a corporation.24
The motion was carried, with only one
exception.  Since the Advertiser did not
comply with Council’s request, this marked
the beginning of a bitter feud between
Council and the Advertiser that lasted
throughout the next referendum.
The Third Referendum and the feud
between City Council and the Advertiser
Because the motion approved by
Council on August 20 called for a bylaw that
included the Coombs’ scheme, the Chair of
the Fire, Water and Gas Committee once
again submitted to the public and Council all
of the elements in the original bylaw, with
one main exception.  In the 1875 bylaw it
was estimated that the overall cost of the
waterworks would be $400,000 whereas now
it was estimated that the overall cost would
be $325,000.25 This $75,000 difference
resulted from a drop in the price of materials
and a drop in the cost of labour between
1875 and 1877.26 Despite the lower cost in
this third bylaw, water would still be
pumped from Coombs’ springs to a reservoir
at the top of Hungerfort Hill where it would
be stored.  When needed, the water would be
fed through pipes to the city where it could
be accessed through hydrants for fire
protection and in homes for domestic use.
The referendum was scheduled to be held on
December 14, 1877.
In the 1870s notices of public meetings
to be held by the City were placed in local
papers in the form of paid advertisements.
Since Council had refused to have any
communication with the editor of the
Advertiser in a “business capacity,” this
meant that Council would no longer insert
paid advertisements in the Advertiser but
instead would confine these to the Free
Press.  The Advertiser resented this position
by Council and addressed the matter in
several editorials that were obviously written
in considerable anger.
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A meeting to discuss the
waterworks scheme will be held
tonight in the Colborne Street
School House in No. 5 Ward.
We give this notice gratuitously
that the ratepayers may know
that the meeting is to take place.
It might be well for someone to
explain why the numerous
property owners and tax-payers
who read only the Advertiser
should be slighted and insulted
by being kept in the dark as to
meetings related to important
additions to the city debt—
meetings advertised in other
papers at the expense of the very
ratepayers so slighted and
insulted.27
We would have the small-potato
majority of the present Council
know that the Advertiser has the
right to the (paid) advertisement
and a right to ask for it, and to
demand the reason for its refusal.
We ask no favors at (Council’s)
hands.  In a week or two (when
the next election is called many of
the current members) will
disappear from the scene, unwept,
unhonoured and unsung.  Because
the Advertiser chooses to oppose
their absurd and trumpery scheme,
got up as much as anything to
create places for one or two
of their number, it is to be
punished, forsooth, by being
refused the official announcement
which is to tell electors where to
record their votes, and what they
are to vote on!28
The Advertiser then chose to further
retaliate by opposing the bylaw itself.  To
fully appreciate the nature of the
Advertiser’s opposition to this third bylaw it
may be helpful to review the Advertiser’s
extremely positive reactions when the same
bylaw was introduced in 1875.  The
following examples are typical of the
laudatory comments that appeared in the
Advertiser prior to the first referendum held
in March, 1875.
We have the most positive
assurances of the promoters of the
scheme that the entire cost will
fall short of the $400,000 asked
for in the by-law. ..29
There are sound and substantial
arguments in favor of the
conclusions of the Council and
nothing to sustain the opposite
contention except an illusory and
shadowy pretense of economy
which would vanish with the
adoption of the scheme.  All who
inhabit, or whose daily
employment forces them to spend
the major part of the day in the
centre of the city must admit that
pure water for drinking and
cooking, is as much a necessity in
its way in the locality referred to,
as water for fire and other public
purposes.30
We hear names mentioned
in connection with the
Commissionerships that should
satisfy the public that no
extravagance or jobbery will mark
the construction of the works, and
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that the wishes of those who
elect them will be scrupulously
attended to.31
In sum, throughout the period leading
up to the first referendum, the Advertiser
never requested any information on the
origin or the accuracy of Council’s initial
cost estimate.  It was also willing to trust
Council’s original claim that the final cost
would be less than the estimated cost, and
that the Commissioners who would be
charged with making the final decisions
were all trustworthy and dependable
individuals.
In sharp contrast to their overall
approval in 1875 of the first bylaw, when
addressing this third bylaw in 1877, the
Advertiser now found considerable reason to
question what was, in reality, the same
information presented by Council in 1875.
As the following examples illustrate, It now
disputed the trustworthy nature of the people
who would serve as Commissioners, the
accuracy of the tax burden that would result
from the new estimated expense, and the
nature of the expense itself.
(Council) should call for actual
tenders from responsible parties
for the necessary supplies of
material and the due performance
of the work required.  These, with
the sums necessary for purchase
of site, right of way, etc., would
give reliable data upon which an
estimate of the cost could be
based.  People would then know
what they are called upon to vote
in the way of additional taxes—a
thing that is now a mere matter of
guess-work. 32
We want the insertion of the
names of the Commissioners who
are to handle and spend the
people’s money.  The persons who
are currently named as probable
Commissioners are not to be
trusted.  The insertion of the
names as Commissioners of
persons in whose honesty the
taxpayers can have confidence
would add enormously to the
strength of the scheme and its
likelihood of being carried.33
We learn from the Hamilton
Spectator that Hamilton expended
originally $850,000 for
waterworks.  This sum paid for a
complete system, including
engines, filtering basin, reservoir,
&, with about seventeen miles of
pipes.  And yet the people of
London are told that they can
build a system of waterworks,
with thirty miles of pipes, for
(only) $325,000.34
There is no mistaking public
sentiment on the above points.  It is
safe to say that three-fourths of the
ratepayers are determined by one
or other of the reasons quoted to
vote down the present by-law, and
all that is necessary to ensure its
overwhelming defeat is that all
opposed to it make it a point to cast
their ballots at the polls tomorrow.
The only hope the schemers have
of carrying the by-law is that the
opposition will not be sufficiently
aroused to turn out and vote.35
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With these key points in mind the
Advertiser then urged its readers to vote
against the bylaw.  It is obvious that this
advice, which appeared in a number of
editorials throughout the period leading up to
the third referendum, had little to do with the
bylaw itself but instead merely reflected   the
Advertiser’s anger over Council’s refusal to
deal with the Advertiser in a “business
capacity” unless the Advertiser apologized for
its intemperate remarks following the second
referendum.  In contrast to the way the
Advertiser addressed the third bylaw, it is
important to mention that The Free Press in
its editorials not only encouraged its readers to
vote in favour of the bylaw, as the following
examples show, but also took issue with much
of the advice that appeared in the Advertiser.
The largest property holders in the
city—those who pay the major
portion of the taxes—and the
electors who desire to see London
prosper, are strong advocates
of the scheme submitted. The
manufactures are, with two
exceptions, in its favour, and in a
word, the men who have made
London what it is, and who have
been foremost in enterprises having
for their object the advancement of
the city’s interests, are the men
who ask their fellow-electors at this
time to assist in the passage of
a measure which is calculated
to enhance the property of every
ratepayer in the city.36
We may economize by refusing to
expend the sum mentioned in the
by-law, and before a year is over we
may have occasion to curse such
short-sighted economy and regret
that we followed the advice of
such counsellors when it is too
late…Every man who respects
himself will regret the abuse that
has been heaped upon the members
of the Council, the insults that have
been offered them, and the
insinuations that have been indulged
in respecting this scheme, when
every elector ought to know that as
the Board of Aldermen are
unanimously of the opinion that
water-works are a necessity, and
that the present is the very best
scheme in their power to offer…
It may seem strange to call
upon those qualified to vote today
to think for and of others as well
as themselves…Anyone who
contemplates the amount of human
suffering that would be entailed
upon the people of this city by a
great fire, would shrink from
incurring the responsibility involved
in voting against this scheme…In
a question of this breadth and
importance, all should think of the
city and its interests as well as of
their individual interests.37
In view of these strongly opposing
views, how did the people vote?  Despite
the onslaught of criticism leveled by the
Advertiser at City Council and the bylaw,
the arguments advanced by the Free Press
did win the day, but only marginally.  On
December 14, 1877, 718 or 54 per cent
voted in favour of the bylaw, while 612 or
46 per cent voted against. 38
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Conclusion
With such a slim a margin of victory it
is certainly possible that the outcome of this
third referendum could easily have turned
out quite differently.  Because Council had
put forward the only two options that were
feasible at the time (Coombs’ springs vs the
river), if the bylaw had been defeated what
might have happened next is impossible to
know since no further waterworks bylaws
were introduced until 1906, 1907, and
1908, and all of these were defeated.  In
fact, it wasn’t until 1909 that a waterworks
bylaw was finally ratified.39
In essence, without proper fire
protection, and through the continued use
of antiquated firefighting procedures,
it goes without saying that over the
years considerable harm could have
been inflicted on London’s fledging
manufacturing and business core.   If this
had happened, it is not inconceivable that
a number of companies that subsequently
located here might have refused to move
to London and gone elsewhere instead.
Hence, the long term impact of this rather
petty controversy between London City
Council and the London Daily Advertiser
could have seriously hampered the city’s
growth and led to a smaller and a far
less prosperous London than the one we
know today.
Postscript
Several months after the third bylaw
was ratified, Council passed a further
bylaw to cover the cost of construction.  It
agreed to issue a series of waterworks
debentures in the amount of $325,033.00
at an annual interest rate of 6 per cent, all
of which were purchased at a discount of
nearly 3 per cent by F. A. Fitzgerald, a
local businessman who was president and
managing director of the Imperial Oil
Company.40 With the necessary funds
now in hand, there was a growing sense of
optimism among Council members.  On
May 6, 1878, Council unanimously
approved a motion to establish a “special
committee to take into consideration the
advisability of offering some inducements
to a certain class of manufacturers that we
have not in this city (in order to encourage
them to locate here).”41 Needless to say,
given the assurance that London would
soon have a fire protection system
comparable to those in Hamilton, Toronto,
Ottawa, etc. the future prospects for the
city finally began to look very bright,
indeed.
The first step in the development of
the waterworks system was to acquire the
necessary land.  Forty-eight acres
surrounding Coombs’ springs were
obtained for the pumphouse along with
approximately 23 acres that included the
top of Hungerfort Hill for the reservoir. In
addition, approximately three acres were
obtained on the north side of the Thames
for access to the pumphouse “from that
side.”42 The 1878 map reproduced on
page 32 shows the location of this property
at the bend in the river along with the
proposed pumphouse, reservoir, and
pipeline from the reservoir to the city.
The next step involved construction.
Work on the pumphouse began in 1878
and was finished in January, 1879.   Made
of stone, and in the shape of an Ontario
Cottage,43 the building measured 36 by 36
feet (10.9 by 10.9 metres),  had an iron
roof and floor girders of sufficient strength
to hold  machinery capable of pumping
three million gallons of water per day to
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the reservoir.  Because the machinery
required water power to operate, a 350
foot (106 metre) “crib dam” was also built
across the river adjacent to the
pumphouse.  The dam was ”constructed of
piles framed together with timber filled in
with stone and planked over…”   The
reservoir, completed around November 1,
1878, measured nearly 300 square feet
(nearly 30 square metres) and, when filled
to a depth of 14 feet (4.26 metres), held
over 6,000,000 gallons (20,000,000 litres)
of water.44
The photograph that also appears on
page 32 shows the pumphouse and the
adjacent crib dam.  The building to the far
right of the pumphouse is a second
pumphouse built in 1881, and the only one
still remaining on this site in Springbank
Park.45
The map on page 33, which is a
continuation of the previous 1878 map,
shows that the proposed hydrants
(depicted as black dots) were to be placed
on almost every street corner in an area
that stretched from Grosvenor Street in the
north to Hill Street in the south, and from
Thames Street in the west to Adelaide
Street in the east. While the 1878 plan
called for 180 hydrants, with installation to
be complete by January, 1879, it was
possible for private firms that required
greater fire protection, to have further
hydrants placed closer to their premises by
paying a yearly rental fee of $37.50 for
each additional hydrant.46 Over time, and
as the need arose, more hydrants were
added.  By 1888, for example, 298
hydrants had been installed and by 1890,
59 additional hydrants were installed.   It
is also worth recalling that prior to 1878
the city only had about 64 water tanks for
use in extinguishing fires (see page 23).
Hence, by initially planning to install 180
fire hydrants, the city would have
achieved a nearly three-fold increase in its
firefighting capacity.
Based on the scale used to construct
the 1878 map, it would appear that for
water from the reservoir to reach the most
distant hydrants, the water needed to travel
approximately five to six kilometers and
arrive at its final destination under
sufficient pressure to extinguish a fire in a
building at least two to three stories in
height.  Indeed, measurements made at the
time revealed a water pressure of 76 to 92
pounds per square inch at the point of
exiting the hydrants.47 How was this feat
accomplished?  First, the water in
Coombs’ springs was transferred to
several nearby collecting ponds.  From
there it was pumped uphill through an 18
inch (42 centimetre) pipeline to the
reservoir.  The water was then fed when
needed via gravity, from the reservoir
through a series of progressively smaller
pipes to the hydrants.  Needless to say, the
successful completion of this complex task
must have represented a substantial
engineering accomplishment in the late
1870s.
One question that immediately
comes to mind, though, is how successful
was the resulting system?  The residents
of London did not have long to wait for
an answer. Recall that construction of all
of the major components in  the  system
was to be completed by  January,  1879.
Less than one month following this
completion date Carling’s Brewery near
Piccadilly, Ann and Talbot streets
experienced a major fire.  Fortunately, the
firemen who arrived at the scene were able
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Photograph of pump house and crib dam. Courtesy of the London Room, London Public Library.
Plan of the London Water Works 1878. From the first annual report of the Board of Water Commissioners
1879. Courtesy of the London Room, London Public Library.
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Continuation of the Plan of the London Water Works 1878 (the black dots show the locations of the proposed fire
hydrants; the numbers refer to city wards). Courtesy of the London Room, London Public Library.
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to attach hoses to several nearby hydrants
which were in good working order. As a
result of this action, even though the building
could not be saved, the blaze was
extinguished.48
Clearly, if water from the hydrants had
not been available, the firemen would have
been forced to rely on water from the nearby
water tanks which could easily have run dry
given the size of the fire.  Moreover, since
that February was an extremely cold month,
the water in these tanks would have been at
least partially frozen, which would have
delayed its use.   Thus, without the hydrants
it is quite possible that the flames from
Carling’s Brewery could easily have spread
to the surrounding neighbourhoods leading,
not only to the loss of other buildings, but
also to the loss of lives. The Free Press had
the following to say about this matter:
…happily, the supply from the waterworks
was continuous, the pressure strong, and
the stream poured upon the smoldering
grain (inside the building) were heavy and
effective in the highest degree.  The
reservoir system so frequently spoken of
as being among the best for extinguishing
fires, proved to be all that had been
claimed for it on this occasion…49
Finally, in addition to fire protection and
in order to encourage the domestic use of the
water delivered through the pipelines, Council
also installed connections from the main
pipeline to individual residences, businesses,
churches, hotels, offices, schools, etc.
throughout the area covered by the fire
hydrants at a cost to the city of $10,409.93, but
at no cost to the owners.   The reason given for
this expense was the expectation that the city
would subsequently realize more than what
was needed to cover this initial cost from
a series of annual water rates such as
the following which were charged to the
property owners (see the Water Commissioners
report on June 30, 1879).
private dwellings not exceeding 3 rooms…..$5
each additional room…………………....$0.75
urinals in private dwellings………….….$4.00
water-closets in private dwellings.……..$3.50
lawn watering (2000 feet and under)…...$4.00
boarding houses per room……………....$1.50
barber shops, per chair………………….$2.50
churches……………………..$5.00 to  $10.00
eating houses………………$15.00 to  $30.00
saloons...................................$15.00 to $25.00
schools, per bed…...................................$1.50
Although Council had estimated that the
annual revenue from these rates would be about
$10,000, in actual fact the city earned
substantially more on a yearly basis.  By 1889
the annual income from the domestic use of this
water had risen to $42,813.41 and a mere six
years later the city enjoyed a windfall profit of
$61, 133.49.  While it is unknown if this use led
to a decline in illness, as predicted, it is very
clear from these figures that City Council had
made a very wise decision indeed when it elected
to connect the main pipeline to residences,
business, etc. free of charge in order to
encourage the use of pure, wholesome spring
water in place of what was often said to be
contaminated well water (see  the City Council
minutes from December 1, 1880 through
November 30, 1881, and Council’s revenue and
expense reports for 1889 and 1895).
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